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Judge Johnson and the Kaleidoscopic First Amendment 
 
Ashutosh Bhagwat1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr.’s decision in Williams v. Wallace,2 in which Judge Johnson 
issued an opinion which permitted the Selma March to proceed despite unremitting opposition 
from local and state authorities, is now a settled part of American history.  Furthermore, today 
few people would question the underlying correctness of the decision.  But in fact, seen in the 
wider context of modern First Amendment jurisprudence, Judge Johnson’s decision was 
remarkable.  Just how remarkable it was becomes apparent when it is contrasted with a decision 
of the United States Supreme Court just a year later, Adderly v. Florida,3 in which the Court 
upheld the trespass convictions of participants in a civil rights protest on the grounds of a county 
jail.  Adderly, authored by that most vociferous defender of civil rights and Justice Hugo Black, 
demonstrates that the modern First Amendment has rarely been interpreted to require access by 
protestors to public property when that access might interfere with its regular uses.  Yet in 
Williams Judge Johnson authorized a 54 mile-long march by 25,000 protestors along a public 
highway!  That two preeminent federal judges, both strong supporters of constitutional liberties 
and both, of course, graduates of the University of Alabama School of Law, could reach such 
different results in similar cases is startling to say the least. 
 
 In this essay, I explore the question of why Judge Johnson ruled the way he did, in the 
face of precedent and judicial norms.  I conclude that while part of the answer lies in the unique 
history of the Selma March, there was an important and insightful legal aspect to Judge 
Johnson’s reasoning as well.  Judge Johnson recognized a truth that many of his contemporaries 
had, and most people today have, forgotten:  the fact that the First Amendment protects many, 
critical political rights, not just freedom of speech, and that the Selma March implicated many of 
those rights.  He also recognized that the democratic rights of the First Amendment are distinct, 
though related, and cumulative, and that it was the cumulative nature of those rights in Selma 
that made the Selma marchers’ claims so powerful.  In other words, Judge Johnson recognized 
the kaleidoscopic nature of the Democratic First Amendment. 
 
 In Part I of this essay I provide a brief description of the events leading up to the Selma 
March, and of Judge Johnson’s opinion permitting the March to proceed.  In Parts II through IV, 
I explore in turn each of the key rights at issue at Selma:  speech, assembly, and petition.  
Finally, in Part V I note how at Selma these rights interacted with each other and strengthened 
one another, and contrast Judge Johnson’s awareness of these interactions with Justice Black’s 
                                                 
1 Martin Luther King, Jr. Professor of Law, University of California, Davis School of Law.  B.A. 1986 
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apparent blindness in Adderly.  I conclude by briefly considering the lessons for today that we 
might derive from Selma and Judge Johnson’s opinion in Williams v. Wallace. 
 
I.  Selma and Williams v. Wallace 
 
 The facts leading up to the Selma March and the decision in Williams v. Wallace are 
recounted in detail in Judge Johnson’s opinion and elsewhere, and will be summarized here 
briefly.  The background to the Selma March was ongoing efforts, starting in 1964, by civil 
rights groups to register African American voters in several counties in central Alabama.  All of 
these counties had African American majority populations, but almost no African Americans of 
voter age had been permitted to register to vote (and therefore, a fortiori, to vote) in the past.  
These registration efforts were met with violent and sometimes deadly resistance by state 
authorities, including notably by Alabama State Troopers under the ultimate control and 
command of Governor George Wallace.4  The registration drive climaxed with an effort on 
March 7, 1965 by a group of 650 African Americans to walk from their church in Selma to 
Montgomery (the state capital) for the purpose of presenting a petition to Governor Wallace 
seeking a redress of grievances regarding voter registration, and interference with past 
demonstrations.  They were met by a group of state and local law enforcement officers, including 
auxiliary deputies of the local county Sheriff known as “possemen,” who proceeded to attack the 
marchers with brutal violence.5  As Judge Johnson noted in his opinion, this attack had no valid 
law enforcement purpose, but rather were designed to thwart the marcher’s efforts to exercise 
their constitutional rights “to assemble peaceably and to petition one’s government for the 
redress of grievances.”6  The latter right, the opinion noted in a key passage, “may be exercised 
in large groups.”7 
 The violence on March 7, which became known as “Bloody Sunday,” galvanized a 
national response.  In response to an invitation from Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., thousands of 
supporters of civil rights descended on Selma, planning to renew the march on March 9.  
Lawyers representing leaders of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee also filed a lawsuit before Judge Johnson seeking an 
injunction to prevent a repeat of Bloody Sunday.  On March 9 Judge Johnson issued a 
Temporary Restraining Order to prevent the march from going forward until he had had time to 
consider the legal issues.8  In response, Dr. King led marchers as far as the bridge out of Selma at 
which the Bloody Sunday attacks had occurred, but then turned around to avoid violating the 
TRO.  On March 15, largely in response to these events, President Lyndon Johnson introduced 
legislation into Congress that ultimately became the Voting Rights Act of 1965.9 
 Meanwhile, the drama in Selma continued.  After a lengthy hearing, on March 17 Judge 
Johnson issued an injunction in favor of the marchers,10 and on March 19 he rejected an 
application to reconsider his decision by Governor Wallace.11  In his opinion, Judge Johnson 
                                                 
4 Williams, supra, 240 F. Supp. at 103-04. 
5 Id. at 104-05; see also Jeff Wallenfeldt, Selma March ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, available at 
https://www.britannica.com/event/Selma-March (last visited Dec. 20, 2018). 
6 Williams, supra, 240 F. Supp. at 105. 
7 Id. at 106. 
8 Id. at 103. 
9 Wallenfeldt, supra n. 5. 
10 Id. 
11 Williams, supra, 240 F. Supp. at 110-11. 
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acknowledged that there can, of course, be no absolute right to march along a highway, given the 
state’s legitimate interest in keeping it open for traffic.12  He concluded, however, that it was the 
court’s job to drawn the “constitutional boundary line” between the plaintiffs’ rights and the 
government’s interests.13  He also emphasized that in drawing the boundary the court must take 
in to account “the enormity of the wrongs” that triggered exercise of rights; and “[i]n this case,” 
he recognized, “the wrongs, are enormous.”14  He also noted two further, critical points.  First, 
under Alabama law the highway along which the marchers planned to travel (U.S. Highway 80) 
was open to pedestrian traffic along the shoulders.  And second, the plaintiffs had proposed a 
careful plan for the march which was designed to minimize the risks of disruption or disorder, 
and which the defendants did not deny was reasonable.15  He conceded that the event planned by 
the plaintiffs “reaches . . . to the outer limits of what is constitutionally allowed,” but determined 
that the march should still proceed because “the wrongs and injustices inflicted upon these 
plaintiffs . . . have clearly exceeded—and continue to exceed—the outer limits of what is 
constitutionally permissible.”16  Finally, Judge Johnson concluded that the marchers were legally 
entitled to police protection from the State of Alabama, and issued on injunction to that effect.17 
 The rest is history.  On March 21, Dr. King lead several thousand marchers out of Selma 
under federal military protection (Governor Wallace having failed to deliver the police protection 
that Judge Johnson’s injunction required).  Thousands more joined the march along the way, 
increasing their numbers to 25,000.  And five days later the marchers arrived in Montgomery, 
where Dr. King delivered his famous “Our God is Marching On” speech (perhaps second in fame 
only to “I Have a Dream”).18  Finally, in an often-ignored but significant denouement, a few 
days after these events civil rights leaders did indeed deliver a written petition to Governor 
Wallace, which he received.19 
 
II.  Free Speech 
 
 The underlying grievance that drove the events in Selma was denial of the right to vote, 
and in particular enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition on racial discrimination 
in voting.  But the actual legal conflicts that arose in Selma, as well as the Williams v. Wallace 
litigation, centered not on the Fifteenth but rather on the First Amendment.  And in particular, 
they focused on the expressive (i.e., the non-religious) rights of the First Amendment.  That 
much is clear. 
 Selma, however, represented an unusual First Amendment conflict, in contemporary 
terms.  The reason is that in the modern era, when one mentions the First Amendment what 
immediately comes to mind is free speech.  Indeed, the modern Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence, aside from cases involving the Religion Clauses, focuses almost 
exclusively on freedom of speech.  The other three expressive rights—freedom of the press, 
assembly, and petition—have essentially vanished.  Regarding the Press Clause, many scholars 
                                                 
12 Id. at 106. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 107-08. 
16 Id. at 108. 
17 Id. at 110. 
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19 RONALD KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE: SEDITIOUS LIBEL, “OFFENSIVE” PROTEST, AND 
THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES 188-89 (2012). 
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have noted that the Supreme Court has interpreted it to give no additional rights to the 
institutional media, and so has essentially folded it into the Speech Clause.20  The Assembly 
Clause has suffered an even worse fate, not having been cited by the Court since 1983,21 even in 
cases where the very issue is the right of groups to gather on public property.22  And while the 
Petition Clause still occasionally appears in Supreme Court cases, its scope has been reduced to 
the point where it too is essentially coterminous with the Speech Clause.23  In recent decades, at 
least in the judiciary the First Amendment means either religion or speech. 
 But not at Selma.  The truth is that during the Selma conflicts, free speech was barely at 
issue.  Bloody Sunday was not triggered by an effort to silence a speaker, the plaintiffs in 
Williams v. Wallace were not primarily seeking the right to speak, and while Dr. King did 
ultimately give a speech in Montgomery, that was after the march had concluded.  Of course, 
speech was a necessary and integral part of the Selma March, in the sense that one cannot 
organize 25,000 people and keep them on the road for 5 days without a lot of talking.  But at its 
heart, Selma was not a dispute over free speech. 
 
III.  Assembly 
 
 If the right to freedom of speech was largely tangential to Selma, the right of assembly 
most assuredly was not.  To the contrary, the right of citizens “peaceably to assemble”24 lay at 
the heart of the conduct that the marchers at Selma were seeking to engage in.  In modern usage 
(whose creation was driven precisely by the civil rights movement), the word “assembly” is 
largely synonymous with a protest rally, and the Selma March was one of the most significant 
such protests in American history.   
 Of course, the constitutional right of assembly is not unlimited.  The Supreme Court has 
long held that restrictions on the time, place and manner of speech and assembly on public 
property are inevitable;25 and indeed has even upheld licensing requirements for such events.26  
Professor Tabatha Abu El-Haj has convincingly demonstrated that many of the Court’s holdings 
in this regard are ahistorical, especially insofar as they uphold licensing requirements;27 but 
nevertheless, since the mid-twentieth century such restrictions have been widely accepted.  In the 
case of the Selma March, as we noted above, Judge Johnson explicitly acknowledged these 
limitations on assembly, but then concluded that given the strength of the plaintiffs’ 
                                                 
20 Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a Realistic Right to Gather 
Information in the Information Age, 65 Ohio St. L.J. 249, 258 n.29 (2004) (citing David A. Anderson, Freedom of 
the Press, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 429, 430, 448–50 (2002)); 3 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH § 22:6, Westlaw (database updated 2014). 
21 JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY 7, 62 (2012). 
22 See, e.g., Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316 (2002) (addressing constitutionality of a Chicago Park 
District requirement of a permit for public assemblies of over 50 people, but discussing only the Free Speech 
Clause, not the Assembly Clause). 
23 Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 386-91 (2011); McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985). 
24 U.S. Const., Amend. I. 
25 See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding ban on use of sound trucks within city limits); Frisby 
v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding ban on targeted residential picketing). 
26 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316 (2002). 
27 Tabatha Abu El-Haj, All Assemble:  Order and Disorder in Law, Politics, and Culture, 16 U. Penn. J. Const. L. 
949, 970 (2014); Tabatha Abu El-Hal, Changing the People:  Legal Regulation and American Democracy, 86 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 40-42 (2011). 
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constitutional interests concerns on the part of the Alabama authorities regarding order or 
disruption were clearly outweighed by the rights of the marchers.28 
 The other major, and even less controversial limit on assemblies is that they must be 
peaceable—as indeed the text of the First Amendment acknowledges.  Of course, drawing the 
line between peaceable and unlawful assemblies is a complicated matter, and again Professor 
Abu El-Haj has demonstrated that historically (i.e., prior to about 1880) the law and authorities 
were far more tolerant of disruptive assemblies than modern practice.29  In any event, in Selma 
the violence was all on the part of the authorities themselves, not the citizens who were 
assembled.  And going forward, Judge Johnson also repeatedly emphasized in the Williams 
opinion that the plaintiffs’ plan for the March was designed to ensure that the protest remained 
peaceful, and so within constitutional protection.30 
 All of this supports the view that the key right at stake in Selma was the right to assemble 
in public.  But in fact, matters are somewhat more complex.  For one thing, as the next section 
discusses, the petition right was as central to the goals of the Selma March as assembly.  But 
more fundamentally, the nature of the assembly right in invoked in Selma was a complex one. 
 This complexity is rooted in history.  In modern times, as noted above, the concept of 
assembly has been treated as identical to protest.  But a look at the roots of the right suggest 
something more nuanced.  Starting with the text, the relevant portion of First Amendment 
protects “the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.”31  The close juxtaposition of assembly with petition has convinced some 
that the right protected is the unitary one of assembling to petition, but it is quite clear that the 
drafting history of the First Amendment is entirely inconsistent with this view.32 What is 
protected are two distinct rights, one of assembly and the other of petition.  More specifically, 
when James Madison introduced what became the Bill of Rights into Congress on June 8, 1789, 
the specific language he proposed read as follows: 
 
The people shall not be restrained from peaceably assembling and consulting for 
the common good; nor from applying to the legislature by petitions, or 
remonstrances for redress of grievance.33 
 
Madison’s language was in turn based on proposals for amendments submitted by the various 
state ratification conventions.  Typical is the language of the Virginia proposal drafted by George 
Mason (which was adopted almost verbatim by New York, North Carolina and Rhode Island), 
which stated: 
 
That the people have a right peaceably to assemble together to consult for the 
common good, or to instruct their Representatives; and that every freeman has a 
right to petition or apply to the legislature for redress of grievances.34 
 
                                                 
28 Williams, supra, 240 F. Supp. at 106-07. 
29 Abu El-Haj, supra n. 27, 16 U. Penn. J. Const. L. at 969-70; Abu El-Haj, supra n. 27, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 42-44.  
30 Williams, supra, 240 F. Supp. at 108, 110. 
31 U.S. Const., Amend. I. 
32 Inazu, supra n. 21, at 22-24 
33 NEIL H. COGAN, ED., THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS:  THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, & ORIGINS 129 (Oxford 
1997). 
34 Id. at 140. 
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 Several points emerge from this brief drafting history.  The first is that given Madison’s 
and Mason’s wording, there can be no doubt that they considered the rights of assembly, 
instruction (in Mason’s case), and petition to be distinct, albeit related rights.  Second, there is 
not even a hint that Madison’s decision to drop the right of instruction from his proposal was 
based on a desire to merge the assembly and petition rights; rather, Madison’s and others’ 
comments make it clear that the decision was grounded in their views regarding the nature of 
representative, deliberative democracy.35 
 But it is the third point that is the crucial one.  The right of assembly was seen primarily 
not as a general right to gather, or even to protest; it was rather an opportunity for sovereign 
citizens “to consult for the common good.”  It was a political right, but its function was not a 
primarily negative or critical one (as protest often is).  Rather, it was a chance for the sovereign 
collective to formulate their views.  These views, when settled upon, may then become the basis 
for voting, or may then (through petition or, again in Mason’s case, instruction) be conveyed 
directly to the citizens’ representatives, presumably with the intent of eliciting legislative action. 
 At heart, then, the assembly right was seen as a deliberative right intended to help inform 
public opinion.  And public opinion, in turn, has always been understood to be at the heart of a 
democracy based on popular sovereignty.  As James Madison put it in 1791, “Public opinion sets 
bounds to every government, and is the real sovereign in every free one.”36  Finally, when seen 
through the lens of the technology available in 1789 (or for that matter 1868), the significance of 
the assembly right in a democratic system of government becomes clear.  After all, in those times 
physical assembly was the only practical means for significant numbers of citizens to actually 
communicate with one another.  As such, without a right of assembly, control over public 
opinion would be restricted entirely to those with access to the press, which would automatically 
exclude most citizens—a system surely antithetical to a functioning democracy. 
 Assembly, then, is a crucial element of the democratic rights protected by the First 
Amendment because of its role in enabling public deliberation.  Protest, while also and surely 
important, was on early understandings a secondary aspect of assembly at best.  But now 
consider Selma.  Whatever the goals of the Selma March (and they were complex), deliberation 
was surely not a major element of them.  For one thing, deliberation and consultation among 
25,000 participants is not practical.  But more fundamentally, participants in the Selma March 
were not there to consider and debate the legitimacy or morality of the disenfranchisement of 
African American voters in Alabama.  They knew it was immoral, and indeed they knew it was 
unconstitutional as well. They purpose of the March was to communicate the breadth and 
strength of public support for that position to Alabama officials and (perhaps more so) to the 
nation as a whole.  It also aimed to make clear to Alabama officials that the grotesque violence 
that predated the March would not silence dissent, as well as to embarrass those officials before 
the eyes of the nation.  In other words, the function of the Selma assembly was not truly 
deliberative, it was rather primarily communicative.  And the audience for that message was a 
complex one, consisting in part of state officials (on which more in the next section), but more so 
a broader, national audience which in turn would put pressure on Congress to enact voting rights 
legislation.  Finally, while it is unlikely that the Selma March changed hearts and minds in the 
Alabama state government, at a national level the it appears to have accomplished exactly that.  
 
                                                 
35 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 242-43 (The Free Press 1993). 
36 James Madison, Public Opinion NATIONAL GAZETTE (December 19, 1791), in WILLIAM T. HUTCHINSON ET AL 
(EDS), PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, vol. 14 (U of Virginia Press 1983). 
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IV.  Petition 
 
 Let us now turn to the Selma Marchers’ purportedly primary audience—state and local 
officials in Alabama.  The original, stated purpose of the march that ended on Bloody Sunday, 
remember, was to deliver a petition regarding voting rights in Montgomery.  And the ultimate 
Selma March that did occur concluded with the delivery of a petition to Governor Wallace.37  
For that reason, just as the Assembly right was central to the events at Selma, so too was the 
right to Petition.  But as with assembly, the role of the petition right at Selma was a complex and 
in some ways ironic one. 
 Let us begin with basics.  The right protected by the First Amendment is the right “to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”38  As the language of the Constitution 
suggests, the petition right was created with a specific purpose—to enable citizens to inform 
their representatives of their complaints or problems, and seek redress (presumably a solution or 
compensation) for the alleged wrongs done to them.  Indeed, the right is not one limited to 
citizens and representatives—it has its roots in pre-Norman England, as a means for individuals 
to seek resolution of private disputes,39 and the Magna Carta recognizes such a right on the part 
of Barons to bring complaints about official misbehavior to the King.  Throughout the middle 
ages petitioning, first to the King but later to Parliament as well, remained an important part of 
English legal and political culture. 
 The key period in the evolution of the Petition right was the seventeenth century.  As the 
century progressed, petitioning evolved from being purely a means of private dispute resolution 
into as well a means to propose legislation and policy;40 and at the same time, it became 
increasingly common for petitions to be presented by associations of citizens/subjects rather than 
merely individuals.41  As such, the petition right was transformed from a quasi-judicial right to a 
political one, culminating with the inclusion in the English Bill of Rights of 1689 of an absolute 
right on the part of the English to petition the King. 
 Given the significance of the right of petition in England, it comes as no surprise that the 
English residents of the American colonies brought this right to their new homes.  Indeed as 
Professor Ron Krotoszynski points out, some colonial assemblies spent most of their time 
responding to petitions from the public, some purely private and some policy-oriented in 
nature.42  By the time of the American Revolution the petition right was so well-established that 
the First Congress received approximately 600 petitions, even though it finished its term before 
the Petition Clause came into effect with the ratification of the First Amendment on December 
15, 1791.43  Finally, and importantly, it is noteworthy that the First and other early Congresses 
not only received and accepted petitions, they felt an obligation to respond to them even if the 
subject matter was a controversial one, such as the abolition of slavery.44  Indeed, this belief that 
Congress was required to respond to petitions was the source of major political controversies 
                                                 
37 KROTOSZYNSKI, supra n. 19, at 188-89. 
38 U.S. Const., Amend. I. 
39 KROTOSZYNSKI, supra n. 19, at 84. 
40 Id. at 86-87 (citing WILLIAM R. ANSON, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE CONSTITUTION, PART 1 at 346 (2nd ed. 
1892). 
41 Jason Mazzone, Freedom’s Association, 77 Wash. L. Rev. 639, 722-23 (2002). 
42 KROTOSZYNSKI, supra n.19, at 104-06. 
43 Id. at 110. 
44 Id. at 111-12. 
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during the run-up to the Civil War, when the bitter divisions over slavery lead to the decline and 
ultimate demise of responses to petitions.45 
 One final point about the petition right.  Today we live in a world of e-petitions and a 
White House websites designed to receive petitions.46  But for most of history, for the petition 
right to work effectively it implied not only a right to submit a paper petition to government 
officials without fear of retaliation, it also implied a right to travel to the seat of government and 
physically deliver the petition.  In no other way (given the parlous state of the mails in eighteenth 
century America) could speedy and effective delivery be ensured.  Indeed, in recognition of this 
tradition the British House of Commons still has a procedure for accepting paper petitions, 
including permitting members to place anonymous petitions in the petitions bag47 (though 
sadly—for this history buff—the UK also appears to be moving towards e-petitions48). 
 Given this history, the significance of petitioning to the Selma March is obvious.  The 
original Bloody Sunday Marchers, as well as the participants in the final March, were invoking a 
very old Anglo-American political right and tradition to bring a focus on their grievances.  And 
by turning to petition, the Marchers were able to make a plausible case for a constitutional right 
to travel to Montgomery to physically deliver the document.  Judge Johnson’s opinion in 
Williams recognized and relied on this point, repeatedly referring to plaintiffs’ right to travel to 
Montgomery to petition state officials.49 
 But now notice an anomaly.  As the historical description above demonstrates, in its 
origins a petition was not seen as a symbolic or purely communicative gesture, designed to bring 
attention to a problem.  Rather, the purpose was to elicit action from the government in the form 
of actual redress.  Indeed, in its roots as a private dispute resolution mechanism petition had no 
symbolic or broadly communicative role, but rather a purely instrumental one.  Of course, during 
the early Republic petitioning did gain an important symbolic function, especially in the context 
of anti-slavery petitioning, but in general petitions were intended to elicit practical action from 
the government. 
 In Selma, however, that surely was not the case.  Not even the most wide-eyed optimist 
would have believed that Governor George Wallace, the arch-segregationist, was going to act 
upon a petition requesting that he permit African American citizens to exercise their 
constitutional right to vote.  If there were any doubts on this point previously (and there were 
none), surely the events of Bloody Sunday demonstrated the point.  Yet the March continued, 
and the petition was delivered.  Why?  Presumably because invoking ancient traditions does 
serve a very important communicative, symbolic function, even if that was not the original 
function of the tradition.  And that function is served even if the formal recipients of the petition 
ignore it altogether.  So as with the assembly right in Selma, the petition right was invoked for 
symbolic and communicative purposes; and the primary actual audience for their petition was 
not the officials to whom it was directed, but rather to the national public and, ultimately, the 
United States Congress. 
 
V.  Free Speech and Assembly and Petition 
                                                 
45 WILLIAM LEE MILLER, ARGUING ABOUT SLAVERY:  JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND THE GREAT BATTLE IN THE 
UNITED STATES CONGRESS 369-71 (1995). 
46 https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2018). 
47 https://www.parliament.uk/get-involved/sign-a-petition/paper-petitions/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2018). 
48 https://petition.parliament.uk/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2018). 
49 Williams, supra, 240 F. Supp. at 106, 107. 
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 To this point, we have seen that the Selma March and the events that followed the March 
in Montgomery implicated speech, assembly, and petition rights to a greater or lesser extent.  We 
have also seen, however, that the ways in which those rights were exercised at Selma did not 
tend to implicate the core, historical function of any of those rights.  Furthermore, while the 
Selma March was probably best characterized as an assembly, as we have seen even Judge 
Johnson acknowledged that the nature of the March, involving thousands of individuals walking 
on a public highway, reached the very limits of the assembly right.  Why then did the plaintiffs in 
Williams v. Wallace prevail?  Part of the answer must lie in the sympathetic nature of their 
cause—what Judge Johnson meant when he said that the wrongs that the Marchers were 
protesting “were enormous.”50  But that is surely not enough to win a constitutional claim, absent 
a reasonable legal argument.  Judge Johnson himself knew and acknowledged that First 
Amendment rights had limits, and did not automatically support all claims even by sympathetic 
plaintiffs such as civil rights protestors.  Indeed, soon after he decided Williams Judge Johnson 
issued two opinions denying First Amendment claims by civil rights protestors on the grounds 
that the protestors’ actions exceeded legal limits.51 
 What was distinctive from a legal perspective about the events in Selma, I would argue, 
is that the Marchers very consciously and publicly combined their exercise of distinct First 
Amendment rights to create a whole that was greater than its parts.  Thus the events at Selma 
began with speech within a religious association (a church congregation) to organize the first, 
March 7 march that ended in violence, and then substantial associational speech in the aftermath 
of March 7 to organize what became the Selma March.  It then proceeded to a major assembly, 
the March itself.  But importantly, the March was not simply an assembly/protest, it was also an 
integral part of the petitioning process because it was intended to deliver a petition to Alabama 
officials in Montgomery.  This fact led Judge Johnson to emphasize in Williams that 
 
the right to petition one’s government for the redress of grievances may be 
exercised in large groups.  Indeed, where, as here, minorities have been harassed, 
coerced and intimidated, group association may be the only realistic way of 
exercising such rights.52 
 
In other words, Judge Johnson was recognizing a hybrid right to associate, assemble, and petition 
in combination with one another.  And it was precisely the hybrid nature of the rights being 
exercised in Selma—because of necessity and design—that made the plaintiffs’ claims in 
Williams so powerful. 
 Indeed, a closer look at the events at Selma reveals just how thoroughly intertwined the 
First Amendment rights at issue there were, and in what complicated ways.  Consider in this 
regard the uses to which the organizers of Selma were putting their assembly and petition rights.  
As noted earlier, the original history and language of the assembly right suggests that assemblies 
were designed to be primarily deliberative, an opportunity for citizens to gather and develop their 
views on “the common good.”  Similarly, the petition right was designed to be instrumental, to 
actually convince the government to take specific actions, originally to resolve private 
                                                 
50 Williams, supra, 240 F. Supp. at 106. 
51 Cochran v. City of Eufaula, Ala., 251 F. Supp. 981 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (Johnson, J.); Johnson v. City of 
Montgomery, 245 F.Supp. 25 (M.D. Ala. 1965) (Johnson, J.). 
52 Williams, supra, 240 F. Supp. at 106. 
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grievances, and later to alter public policy as well.  But as also noted earlier, in Selma neither of 
these functions was meaningfully in play.  The Selma March was transformative, but not truly 
deliberative.  And the Selma Marchers surely did not expect their petition to generate legislative 
or executive action from Alabama officials. 
Instead, the March was first and foremost expressive.  It was communicating a message, 
albeit not a message primarily through words.  Instead, the participants were communicating 
through specific actions:  gathering in associations, organizing an assembly, and delivering a 
petition.  And this is an entirely appropriate use of these rights because of the intertwined and 
“cognate” (to quote the Supreme Court) nature of the political rights protected by the First 
Amendment.53  These rights serve common, democratic ends, and operate separately but also in 
tandem.  Assemblies might be deliberative, but they are also and always expressive as well.  
Gathering 25,000 people to march for five days sends a message that no words alone can 
express.  Similarly, a petition makes crystal clear that the problems that are being addressed by 
actors are not inevitable, they are in fact solvable through specific governmental actions.  Again, 
speeches alone do not deliver that message with the same force and clarity that a petition 
requesting specific action does.  For all of these reasons, what we saw at Selma was the ultimate 
example in American history of the cognate rights of the First Amendment in action. 
The significance of the in-tandem operation of First Amendment rights at Selma, and of 
Judge Johnson’s appreciation of this fact in Williams v. Wallace, becomes clear when one 
contrasts Johnson’s analysis in Williams with the Supreme Court’s First Amendment analysis 
just a year later in another case involving civil rights protestors, Adderly v. Florida.54  In 
Adderly, students at Florida A. & M. University were challenging their trespass convictions for 
participating in a peaceful protest on the grounds of a county jail (the protest was targeted, 
ironically, at the arrest of other students the previous day).  Justice Hugo Black wrote an opinion 
for a 5-4 majority of the Court rejecting the students’ First Amendment claims.  Furthermore, 
Justice Black’s opinion can only be described as curt and dismissive.  He began by quickly and 
flatly rejecting several (admittedly weak) arguments by the protestors, and then turned to the key 
First Amendment issues.  With respect to these, he concluded that the Sheriff of Leon County, 
who operated the jail, had a perfect right to exercise control over government property to 
maintain its use as a jail.  He phrased the question raised in the case as whether “people who 
want to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so whenever and 
however and wherever they please.”55  And having stated the issue in such an exaggerated and 
inflammatory manner, Black easily rejected the claim with the famous statement that “[t]he 
State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its 
control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.”56 
How could Justice Black, one of the great lions of civil liberties on the Supreme Court 
and perhaps the strongest defender of First Amendment rights in the history of the Court, have 
been so unsympathetic to the serious First Amendment issues raised in Adderly?  The reason, I 
think, is that Justice Black, by focusing exclusively on freedom of speech, missed the complex 
nature of the claims raised by the Adderly defendants.  That Justice Black was focused on speech 
is clear from the opinion.  As just noted, he characterized the protestors’ claim as one to 
“propagandize.”  And elsewhere, he emphasized that given the neutral nature of trespass law, 
                                                 
53 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). 
54 385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
55 Id. at 48. 
56 Id. at 47. 
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there were no grounds to believe that the Sheriff had arrested the protestors “because the sheriff 
objected to what was being sung or said by the demonstrators or because he disagreed with the 
objectives of their protest.”57  From that perspective, his easy rejection of the First Amendment 
claims in Adderly makes sense.  After all, removal from grounds of the jail did not meaningfully 
restrict the protestors’ ability to communicate their message—they could just as easily have lined 
up across the street from the jail, outside of the curtilage.  Or they could have protested in front 
of other government buildings which were not closed to the public.  To use the modern jargon, 
there seems no doubt that closing the jail grounds to protests nevertheless left speakers with 
“ample alternative channels of communication.”58 
What Justice Black missed was that far more was at issue in Adderly than free speech.  
The defendants in Adderly explicitly claimed “rights of free speech, assembly, petition, due 
process of law and equal protection of the laws.”59  Leaving aside due process and equal 
protection, it is quite clear that the protestors in Adderly were invoking their cognate, First 
Amendment rights as a whole, not just a right to speak.  But once one recognizes this, Justice 
Black’s analysis becomes unsupportable.  Consider his statement that the government, “no less 
than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use 
to which it is lawfully dedicated.”  That perspective is perhaps (though probably not) defensible 
when speech alone is at issue.  But if literally accepted, such a power on the part of the 
government would eviscerate the right of assembly.  After all, given government ownership of 
public spaces, assemblies of any significant size must occur on government property.  If the 
government chooses to “dedicate” parks to recreation and streets to traffic, as Justice Black 
suggests they might, then assembly would cease to exist as a meaningful right.  As Professor 
Abu El-Haj has demonstrated, however, that is not our constitutional tradition.60 To the contrary, 
historically not only did the government lack the power to exclude assemblies of citizens from 
public spaces by fiat, or to require the government’s consent (via permitting schemes) for 
citizens’ assemblies; it also was required to tolerate substantial amounts of disruption and 
disturbance in public assemblies, so long as they did not cross the line into violence.61  
Furthermore, these rules had good reasons behind them.  Assembly is one of the crucial political 
rights of the First Amendment, and without it democratic self-governance itself would be in 
grave danger.  Democracy, in other words, is worth a little disruption. 
Not only was Justice Black’s analysis inconsistent with the very nature of an assembly 
right, it also threatens to significantly restrict the right to petition.  As noted earlier, the right of 
petition is an extremely ancient one, predating Anglo-American democracy.  However, the 
Framers understood that a petition right is particularly essential in a representative democracy 
(what they would have called a Republic62) because it provides a crucial means for citizens to 
communicatee with and express their desires to representatives between elections—indeed, for 
non-citizens and for citizens who are denied the franchise (who were a majority of adults in the 
Framing era), petitions are the only formal means to seek to influence legislators.  But, especially 
in the days before the Internet or electronic communications more generally, to deliver a petition 
                                                 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 
468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
59 Adderly, 385 U.S. at 41. 
60 Abu El-Haj, supra n. 27, 16 U. Penn. J. Const. L. at 968-71. 
61 Ibid. 
62 See James Madison, Federalist No. 10. 
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required physical access to the representatives to whom the petition was directed.63  If the 
government were truly free to exclude the public from locations were representatives work, then 
the petition right too would be rendered meaningless.  And it is important to note in this regard 
that the Sheriff of Leon County is an elected official (at least he is elected today, 64 and 
presumably was also so when the events in Adderly took place though I have been unable to 
verify that fact)  to whom citizens have a clear, constitutional right to deliver petitions.  After all, 
the petition right extends to executive as well as legislative officials—recall that the petition right 
protected in the 1689 English Bill of Rights was the right to petition the King. 
None of this is to say, of course, that governments cannot place any limits on public 
access to elected officials or government property.  Clearly Adderly and her companions had no 
right to protest in the Sheriff’s office, any more than in the Oval Office.  And if the sort of access 
that is being sought by members of the public cannot be reconciled with the property’s functions, 
then access may also be limited.  Indeed, Justice Black suggested that this might have been the 
situation in Adderly; but Justice Douglas’s dissent convincingly refuted that argument by 
pointing out that the protestors were not blocking an entrance or driveway, and if they were 
doing so they could have simply been asked to move (as happened with an entrance).65  Finally, 
in special circumstances such as the White House, where security concerns are paramount, 
entirely excluding the public at times may be permissible—but only so long as alternative means 
to assemble and petition specific officials are made available.  To entirely exclude the public 
from the seat of an elected official and the curtilage around it, however is extremely difficult to 
reconcile with the petition right absent such special circumstances (which did not appear to exist 
in Adderly). 
The truth is that it is difficult to understand how Justice Black and the Adderly majority, 
just a year after Selma, could have missed these points.  This is especially so because Justice 
Douglas in dissent explicitly drew the connection between assembly, petition, and the need for 
public access to seats of government.66  But miss them the majority did, and the consequences 
have been highly problematic.  Adderly represents the beginning of two trends on the Supreme 
Court—a myopic focus on freedom of speech at the expense of the rest of the democratic First 
Amendment,67 and a steady movement towards upholding ever more restrictive rules governing 
access to public property for expressive purposes68—which have been the banes of modern First 
Amendment jurisprudence.  It is noteworthy in this respect that in the perhaps the key modern 
case narrowing the scope of the public forum doctrine, and so of the right to use public property 
for expressive and assembly purposes, a concurring opinion explicitly quoted Justice Black’s 
language in Adderly (albeit, oddly, without properly attributing it),69 and the majority opinion 
embraced the spirit of Adderly.70 
                                                 
63 Professor Krotoszynski elaborates on this point extensively in his book-length treatment of the Petition Clause.  
See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra n. 19, at 197-205. 
64 http://www.leoncountyso.com/about-us/meet-sheriff-mcneil (last visited Jan. 11, 2019). 
65 Adderly, 385 U.S. at 51-52 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
66 Id. at 54-55 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
67 See supra at __. 
68 See, e.g., International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (airports) (“ISKCON”); 
Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (inter-school mail system); 
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (portions of military bases open to the public). 
69 ISKCON, supra, 505 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
70 Id. at 678 (“Where the government is acting as a proprietor, managing its internal operations, rather than acting as 
a lawmaker with the power to regulate or license, its actions will not be subjected to the heightened review to which 
its actions as lawmaker may be subject.”). 
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Which brings us to the present day.  In Williams v. Wallace Judge Johnson took a 
syncretic and strongly protective approach to First Amendment rights and thereby enabled one of 
the key events in modern American history.  In Adderly v. Florida Justice Black and the 
Supreme Court took a narrow, free speech-focused and skeptical approach to the First 
Amendment, and so began a trend that to this day continues to hobble the rights of citizens to 
access public property in order to exercise their First Amendment rights.  In that sense Adderly is 
a key source from which such modern travesties as “free speech zones,” onerous licensing 
requirements for assemblies on public property, and strict time, place and manner rules 
governing speech and assembly, emerged. 
If we are to restore the democratic rights of the First Amendment to their preferred and 
central place in the practice of democratic self-governance, these developments must be 
reconsidered.  Assembly and petition (and a free press and freedom of association) must be 
restored to their central place, alongside free speech, in the pantheon of First Amendment rights.  
A focus on speech alone suggests that fears of disruption outweigh constitutional rights.  When 
the assembly right is taken into account, it becomes clear that history rejects this calculus and to 
the contrary, requires toleration of substantial disruption.  Similarly, restricting First Amendment 
rights in the vicinity of public officials might be defensible when only speech rights are 
considered, but becomes indefensible in light of the petition right.  For these reasons we must 
recover all of the rights of the First Amendment, and recall the close relationships and 
interactions between them.  Only then can the First Amendment properly fulfill its democratic 
functions. 
 
Coda:  Religion 
 
 The discussion above of the events and legal conflicts surrounding the Selma March 
demonstrates that the events at Selma implicated three of the key democratic rights of the First 
Amendment:  speech, assembly, and petition.  It also illustrates how these rights worked in 
tandem to complement and strengthen one another, which in turn strengthened the plaintiffs’ 
legal claims.  And while this essay does not explore this in detail, Selma also implicated the 
other two key democratic rights of the First Amendment:  freedom of the press and freedom of 
association.71  The national press, after all, played a crucial role in reporting on the events at 
Selma to a national audience, and so made the Marchers’ message effective.  And associations 
such as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and Dr. King’s Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) played a crucial role in organizing the March.  For that 
reason, Selma perhaps as much as any event in American history implicated and involved the full 
spate of rights protected by the Democratic First Amendment. 
 But there is an elephant in the room, and it is religion.  For reasons I have explained in 
detail elsewhere, the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment do not properly belong in the 
Democratic First Amendment because unlike the latter part of the Amendment, the Religion 
Clauses were not designed to serve a primarily political function.72  But as the name of the SCLC 
and the professional status as pastors of many of the March’s leaders indicate, religion was 
certainly present in Selma, and in force.  That personal rights of conscience should play an 
                                                 
71 For a more detailed discussion of how and why these five rights constitute the Democratic First Amendment, see 
Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment, 110 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1097 (2016). 
72 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Religious Associations:  Hosanna-Tabor and the Instrumental Values of Religious Groups, 92 
Wash. U. L. Rev. 73, 92-93 (2014). 
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important role in triggering and motivating the exercise of collective political rights should come 
as no surprise to anyone familiar with the history of the civil rights movement (or the abolition 
movement, or the temperance movement, or many other movements for political change).  But of 
course secular groups like SNCC also played pivotal roles at Selma and elsewhere.  The 
interaction between religious and secular associations in the political arena, and more 
fundamentally the role of religious groups in political activities are extremely complex issues 
worthy of sustained attention.  But they must be left to another day. 
